

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NASSAU 01712 01 OF 03 052204Z

66

ACTION ARA-20

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AID-05 L-03 IGA-02 DRC-01 RSC-01 /033 W

----- 016923

R 051750Z OCT 74

FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6062

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 NASSAU 1712

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: EAID, BF

SUBJECT: BLRD: DISCUSSION WITH MINEXTAFF ADDERLEY

FOR AID/ AA/TA

BEGIN SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR WAS CALLED TO MEETING 10/2 WITH MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ADDERLEY FOR AN EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF BAHAMAS LIVESTOCK RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT PROJECT ON ANDROS. DISCUSSION RANGED OVER SPECTRUM FROM BROAD POLICY ISSUES TO DETAILED ADMINISTRATIVE CONCERNS OF GCOB. SO FAR AS CAN BE JUDGED, THE RESULTS OF THE CONVERSATION SEEMED TO FULLY SATISFY ADDERLEY. END SUMMARY.

1. ADDERLEY BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE APPRECIATED I MIGHT NOT HAVE FULL BACKGROUND ON HISTORY AND STATUS OF ANDROS PROJECT AND IN ANY EVENT WISHED TO RECITE GCOB PERSPECTIVE. IN THIS CONNECTION, ADDERLEY REFERRED TO INITIAL CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVE IN RELATION TO THE AID PROGRAM AND THE FACT THAT PROJECT GOT UNDER WAY WITH A CERTAIN POTENTIAL FOR MISUNDERSTANDING. SO FAR AS MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS WAS CONCERNED, ITS INTEREST WAS POLICY LEVEL ISSUES. HE NOTED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT GCOB VIEWS THE TWO AGREEMENTS, I.E. THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT AND THE SUBSEQUENT PROJECT AGREEMENT, AS HAVING SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT STATUS. THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT WAS A "GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENT", WHILE THE PROJECT AGREEMENT WAS A TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTING ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE PERSONNEL." HE REPEATED HIS INTEREST WAS LIMITED TO THE BROAD POLICY ISSUES AS EMBODIED IN THE TECHNICAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NASSAU 01712 01 OF 03 052204Z

ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT AND WAS NOT CONCERNED WITH GETTING INTO

THE DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTATION. HE NOTED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT THIS PRESENTED WHAT HE REFERRED TO AS "INTERNAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES FOR GCOB" BUT THAT THESE WERE NOT OF MAJOR CONSEQUENCE. (COMMENT: IT WAS PERFECTLY APPARENT THAT ADDERLEY WAS ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH THE LEGITIMACY OF HIS MINISTRY'S INTEREST IN THIS MATTER WITHOUT AT THE SAME TIME TOTALLY UNDERCUTTING MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE ROBERTS.) ADDERLEY ASKED MY VIEWS BOTH ON QUESTION OF WHETHER FORTHCOMING MEETING WOULD EMPHASIZE POLICY OR PROJECT DETAILS, AS WELL AS WITH REGARD TO HIS PREVIOUS COMMENTS.

2. IN RESPONSE I MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. USG DID NOT VIEW THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT AND THE PROJECT AGREEMENT IN QUITE AS SHARP A DICHOTOMY AS DID GCOB. THE TWO ARE CONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER. WHILE THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT WAS CLEARLY GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT, WHEN AMBASSADOR OR REPRESENTATIVES FROM WASHINGTON ENTERED INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE OR OTHER SENIOR LEVEL OFFICIALS OF GCOB, WE SIMILARLY CONSIDERED THESE TO BE GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT DEALINGS.

B. I NOTED THAT IT WAS NOT ALWAYS EASY TO DRAW A SHARP DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN " PURELY TECHNICAL ISSUES" AND "PURELY POLICY ISSUES." FREQUENTLY THERE WERE IMPORTANT INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE TWO. I HAD FOUND IT NECESSARY TO SUFFICIENTLY IMMERSE MYSELF IN THE DETAILS OF THE PROGRAM IN ORDER TO APPRECIATE THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS.

C. WITH REGARD TO THE ORIGINS OF THE PROGRAM, I STATED THAT I THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS GERMANE ONLY INsofar AS IT HAS COLORED THE HANDLING OF THIS PROGRAM TO DATE, AND I HOPED WOULD HAVE RELATIVELY LITTLE BEARING ON HOW THE PROGRAM PROCEEDED FROM HERE. BASED UPON MY OWN EXPERIENCE WITH AID PROGRAMS, MY ATTITUDE WAS THAT SUCH PROGRAMS CAN AND HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL BOTH IN ADVANCING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS AND THE LEGITIMATE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF THE RECIPIENT COUNTRIES. WHILE THIS WAS TRUE IN MOST INSTANCES, OCCASIONALLY IT WAS NOT, IN WHICH EVENT SUCH PROGRAMS WERE BEST TERMINATED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NASSAU 01712 01 OF 03 052204Z

RATHER THAN BEING PERMITTED TO CREATE UNEASINESS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE RECIPIENT. I EMPHASIZED (AS I HAD IN EARLIER CONVERSATION WITH ROBERTS) THAT I DID NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ANDROS PROJECT FELL INTO THE CATEGORY OF AN UNSUCCESSFUL AID UNDERTAKING WHATEVER ITS GENESIS MAY HAVE BEEN. TO THE CONTRARY, IT WAS MY VIEW THAT THE PROGRAM COULD BE A GENUINE SUCCESS JUDGED BY ANY REASONABLE STANDARDS, PROVIDED WE TOOK WELL

PLANNED, MUTUALLY AGREED ACTIONS OVER THE NEXT THREE PLUS YEARS OF THE UNDERTAKING.

D. RELATED TO THE PRECEDING POINT, I SAID THAT IT WAS MY HOPE AND EXPECTATION THAT UPCOMING MEETINGS WOULD FOCUS ON PRECISELY THIS THEME AND THAT OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO EXPLORE HOW PROGRAM COULD BE CONDUCTED TO MUTUAL BENEFIT OF BOTH PARTIES. I RELATED THAT OUR EXPERTS HAD BEEN WORKING ON A RANGE OF OPTIONS WHICH EXTENDED AT ONE END OF THE SPECTRUM FROM THAT LIMITED ESSENTIALLY TO RESEARCH, TO THE OTHER WHICH WOULD INVOLVE THE APPLICATION OF THAT RESEARCH THROUGH A PILOT PROJECT AND TO WHAT COULD BECOME A VIABLE CATTLE RAISING INDUSTRY. THE KEY ISSUE WOULD BE THE EXTENT OF RESOURCES WHICH THE GCOB FELT ABLE TO DEVOTE TO THIS PROJECT. THIS IN TURN BEARING ON GCOB JUDGEMENT OF ITS PRIORITIES AND PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS. I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT WE COULD EXPECT TO COME OUT OF THE PROJECTED 2 DAY MEETING WITH DETAILED PLANS AGREED TO BY BOTH SIDES. I HOPED, HOWEVER, WE COULD REACH A GENERAL CONSENSUS ON APPROACH AND THAT OUR OPTIONS WERE DESIGNED TO ELICIT DISCUSSIONS AND SOLICIT GCOB VIEWS, AND WE WERE AMENABLE TO ATTEMPTING TO REACH COMMON GROUND.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NASSAU 01712 02 OF 03 052210Z

60

ACTION ARA-20

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AID-05 L-03 IGA-02 DRC-01 RSC-01 /033 W

----- 016940

R 051750Z OCT 74

FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6063

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 NASSAU 1712

FOR AID AA/TA

THE ONE RESULT WHICH WAS IMPORTANT WAS THAT WE HAVE A BASIS FOR SUBSEQUENTLY DEVELOPING A DETAILED PLAN.

3. ADDERLEY RESPONDED WITH POSITIVE ENTHUSIASM. HE STATED, SOMEWHAT APOLOGETICALLY, THAT HAVING EARLIER SAID THAT HE WAS PRINCIPALLY INTERESTED IN BROADER POLICY ISSUES, HE NEVERTHELESS DID HAVE A SERIES OF DETAILED POINTS WHICH

HE WISHED TO DISCUSS WITH ME. HE EMPHASIZED (A POINT WHICH HE REPEATEDLY REVERTED TO AS THE CONVERSATION PROCEEDED) THE ESSENTIALITY OF A DETAILED PLAN. HE COULD NOT PERSONALLY UNDERSTAND HOW THE PROJECT HAD PROCEEDED TO DATE WITHOUT SUCH DETAILED PLANNING, AND THAT FROM THE GCOB POINT OF VIEW SUCH A PLAN WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE FUTURE.

IN THIS CONNECTION (HE NOTED SUBSEQUENTLY) THAT FOR A JUDGEMENT TO BE MADE AS TO THE LEVEL OF RESOURCES TO BE APPLIED, THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE A GOVERNMENT DECISION, NOT ONE SOLELY TO BE MADE BY THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE. IN TURN, TO MAKE SUCH A BUDGETARY DECISION, A DETAILED PLAN WAS ESSENTIAL.

4. FURTHER WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF COSTS, HE SAID THAT HE HAD GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND THAT, PERHAPS IN VIEW OF THE LACK OF A DETAILED PLAN, THE ORIGINALLY CONTEMPLATED PROJECT WOULD NOW COST MORE, E.G. MIGHT COST \$15 MILLION.

HE ASKED, SOMEWHAT DEFERENTIALLY, WHETHER I THOUGHT ADDITIONAL FUNDS WOULD BE FORTHCOMING. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THEY WOULD NOT. IN THE PRESENT ATMOSPHERE IN WASHINGTON, I COULD NOT IMAGINE INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF RESOURCES FOR AID PROGRAMS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NASSAU 01712 02 OF 03 052210Z

IN GENERAL, NOT TO MENTION THIS PROJECT IN PARTICULAR. I SAID THE ISSUE WAS HOW THE REMAINING AID FUNDS SHOULD BE APPLIED. IF THE GCOB OPTED TO PROVIDE LIMITED FUNDS AND PERSONNEL, THE RESULTANT PROJECT WOULD BE MORE NARROWLY RESEARCH ORIENTED AND MY ASSUMPTION WAS THAT THIS WOULD MEAN MORE IN THE WAY OF PERSONNEL CUTS IN THE PURELY RESEARCH FIELD WITH LESS FUNDS DEVOTED TO DEVELOPING THE PILOT PROJECT, I.E. CLEARING LAND, RAISING CATTLE, ETC.

5. ADDERLEY RESPONDED THAT THIS SEEMED REASONABLE TO HIM AND STATED THAT HE PERSONALLY FAVORED A MORE AMBITIOUS GCOB SUPPORT FOR THE PROJECT WHICH, REFERRING TO MY EARLIER COMMENTS, HE TOO, BELIEVED COULD BE SUCCESSFUL. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED THE NEED FOR RESEARCH AS A PRE CONDITION TO ACHIEVING A MORE SUBSTANTIVE ECONOMIC PAY OFF IN THE WAY OF A CATTLE RAISING INDUSTRY. HE COMMENTED THAT HIS OWN APPRECIATION OF THIS ISSUE WAS NOT FULLY SHARED ELSEWHERE, NOTING IN PASSING THAT THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE UNDERSTANDABLY FELT A PRESSURE "TO PRODUCE SOMETHING TANGIBLE."

6. ADDERLEY ALSO REFERRED TO THE GCOB'S REQUEST THAT FARM EQUIPMENT AT ANDROS BE USED FOR OTHER AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES BUT NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE LIVESTOCK PROJECT AND NOT PRECISELY ON SITE. IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS HAD BEEN REFUSED. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE GCOB HAD LIMITED RESOURCES ESPECIALLY OF SUCH HEAVY EQUIPMENT AND APPRECIATED THE ABILITY TO USE WHAT WAS AVAILABLE, ESPECIALLY WHEN IT WAS

NOT OTHERWISE BEING EMPLOYED. HE NOTED THAT SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES HAD ARISEN AT AUTECH SITE AND THAT THE USG HAD ALWAYS BEEN QUITE FORTHCOMING. I STATED THAT MY IMPRESSION WAS THE THE ISSUE HE IDENTIFIED HAD BEEN RAISED AND THAT, IN DUE COURSE, APPROVAL HAD BEEN GIVEN FOR THE USE OF EQUIPMENT AT ANDROS FOR OFF SITE PROJECTS. I SAID THAT IN MY VIEW SUCH USE WAS APPROPRIATE SO LONG AS THE PRIVILEGE WAS NOT ABUSED AND THE END USE WAS LEGITIMATELY RELATED TO IMPROVING GCOB AGRICULTURAL SITUATION. I SAID, HOWEVER, I WOULD CHECK MY UNDERSTANDING. (COMMENT: I SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED ADDERLEY TO CORRECT THE RECORD NOTING THAT AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE HAD BEEN REACHED BUT NOT ON DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENT)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NASSAU 01712 02 OF 03 052210Z

7. ADDERLEY RAISED QUESTION OF QUALIFICATIONS OF ARCHITECTS IN RELATION TO BUILDING BUILDINGS AT ANDROS SITE, STATING THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT CERTAIN GCOB ARCHITECTS, TRAINED IN BRITAIN, HAD BEEN DISQUALIFIED. I SAID I WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THIS ISSUE AND WOULD CHECK ON THE FACTS.

8. ADDERLEY THEN RAISED QUESTION OF "PAYMENT OF GCOB COUNTERPART STAFF." HE INDICATED THAT THE QUESTION HAD BEEN RAISED AS TO WHETHER GCOB PERSONNEL WORKING ON THE PROJECT SHOULD BE PAID FROM US AID FUNDS. I SAID THAT IT WAS NOT MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS WAS TO BE THE ARRANGEMENT. I SAID THAT MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT SUCH PERSONNEL WERE TO BE FUNDED BY GCOB AND, AS I HAD EARLIER INDICATED, IT WAS THIS ISSUE OF LEVEL OF GCOB FINANCING WHICH WOULD ULTIMATELY DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THE END RESULTS. I SAID THAT MY READING OF THE TECHNICAL AGREEMENT AND THE PROJECT AGREEMENT SEEMED TO ME TO SUPPORT THIS POSITION AND THAT MOREOVER IN MY PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WITH AID PROGRAMS, GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL WHO WERE TO WORK ON THE PROJECT AND WHO PRESUMABLY WOULD REMAIN ON HAVING BENEFITTED FROM THE TRAINING PROVIDED, WERE CLEARLY THE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE RECIPIENT GOVERNMENT. ADDERLEY QUICKLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS WAS FRANKLY HIS UNDERSTANDING AS WELL BUT STRONGLY IMPLIED THAT THIS WAS AN ISSUE WHICH HAD BEEN RAISED AND WHICH HE WAS IN TURN REQUIRED TO RAISE WITH ME.

9. AS A RELATED QUESTION, ADDERLEY QUERIED AS TO WHETHER PEOPLE SENT TO THE UNITED STATES WERE THE TOTAL FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GCOB. I SAID THAT I WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE DETAILS BUT THAT MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE TUITION OF NORMAL SCHOOL EXPENSES OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS WERE COVERED BY THE USG. IF SUCH INDIVIDUALS WERE EMPLOYEES OF THE GCOB, THEIR SALARIES, ETC, WERE OF COURSE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GCOB. HE SEEMED FULLY SATISFIED WITH THIS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NASSAU 01712 03 OF 03 052211Z

66

ACTION ARA-20

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AID-05 L-03 IGA-02 DRC-01 RSC-01 /033 W

----- 016948

R 051750Z OCT 74

FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6064

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 NASSAU 1712

10. ADDERLEY ALSO RAISED QUESTION CONCERNING REIMBURSEMENT OF LOCALLY CONTRACTED EXPERTS, SATELLITE FARMS, AND THE "STAFFORD CREEK" PROBLEM. I TOOK HIS QUESTION ON THE FIRST TWO. ON THE THIRD, ADDERLEY, APPEARING SOMEWHAT EMBARRASSED, STATED THAT HE HOPED THAT THE "STAFFORD CREEK" PROBLEM COULD BE SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED. HE WENT INTO CONSIDERABLE BACKGROUND ON BAHAMIAN ATTITUDES IN THE OUT ISLANDS. HE NOTED THAT OUT ISLANDERS TENDED TO BE PAROCHIAL VIEWING BAHAMIANS FROM OTHER ISLANDS AS BEING "FOREIGNERS", AND BELIEVING THAT EVEN WITHIN AN ISLAND PARTICIPATION IN ANY PARTICULAR UNDERTAKING HAD TO BE DISTRIBUTED EQUITABLY. THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY A MATTER OF CONSIDERABLE CONCERN TO THE PRIME MINISTER. I SAID THAT AS DOUBTLESS KNEW FROM OUR EARLIER REPRESENTATIONS, WE WERE DISTRESSED THAT A COMMITMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE WHICH WAS IN NO WAY CONSISTENT WITH ANY PRIOR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE USG. I STATED, HOWEVER, THAT MY OWN RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE MATTER WOULD BE THAT INsofar AS THERE WAS A LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL, AND INsofar AS THOSE INDIVIDUALS MET OBJECTIVE STANDARDS CONSISTENT WITH THE NEED, FROM WHENCE THOSE INDIVIDUALS WERE DRAWN WAS A MATTER FOR THE GCOB. ADDERLEY QUICKLY STATED THAT THE SORT OF INDIVIDUALS THEY HAD IN MIND WERE PURELY LABORERS AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE ABLE TO MEET REASONABLE QUALIFICATIONS, AND FURTHERMORE, GCOB WOULD BE QUITE HAPPY IF SUCH INDIVIDUALS WERE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY FOR EMPLOYMENT AS VACANCIES PRESENTED THEMSELVES. HE STATED THAT FRANKLY IT HAD BEEN THE FAULT OF THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE NOT TO HAVE BEEN MORE SENSITIVE OF THE NEED TO SPREAD THE JOB APPLICANTS AROUND QUALIFIED PEOPLE ON ANDROS SO THAT A CONSTITUENCY SUCH AS STAFFORD CREEK WAS NOT WITHOUT REPRESENTATION. HE HOPED, HOWEVER, THAT WE COULD

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NASSAU 01712 03 OF 03 052211Z

BE HELPFUL IN THE FUTURE IN EMPLOYING SUCH PEOPLE AS QUALIFIED REPLACEMENTS.

11. WHEN ADDERLEY MENTIONED THAT HE WAS INFORMED THAT "REPORTS ON THE PROJECT HAD BEEN SLOW IN REACHING THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE", I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO POINT OUT THAT IF THE GCOB HAD APPOINTED A PROJECT CO-MANAGER, HE PRESUMABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN SENTITIVE TO THE NEED FOR RAPID REPORTING. I SAID I HOPED THAT ONE MATTER WHICH WOULD EMERGE FROM OUR UPCOMING DISCUSSIONS WAS AGREEMENT TO HAVE A PERMENENT AID OFFICIAL AT THE PROJECT, TOGETHER WITH A COUNTERPART BAHAMIAN OFFICIAL, WHICH WOULD HOPEFULLY FACILITATE MANY ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. ADDERLEY STRONGLY SUPPORTED THIS IDEA.

12. COMMENT: WE ARE AWARE THAT THE CABINET SPENT THE ENTIRE DAY YESTERDAY (OCTOBER 1) MEETING ON OUR UPCOMING SESSIONS. THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT THAT ADDERLEY WAS COMMISSIONED BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO INJECT HIMSELF INTO THE DISCUSSIONS IN ORDER TO EVIDENCE THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE GCOB VIEWS THE ANDROS PROJECT. ADDERLEY SAID AS MUCH IN APOLOGIZING FOR CALLING ME ON SHORT NOTICE, SAYING HE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE. FURTHER, HOW MUCH THIS REPRESENTS AN IMPLIED LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE ANTHONY ROBERTS IS HARD TO JUDGE. BY NATURE ROBERTS GIVES THE IMPRESSION OF A SLOW BUT BY NO MEANS UNREASONABLE MAN. ON THE OTHER HAND, ADDERLEY HAS A QUICK MIND AND IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE MOST BRILLIANT MEMBER OF THE CABINET. IT WOULD NOT BE SURPRISING THEREFORE IF PINDLING RELIED ON HIM FOR A MATTER SUCH AS THIS, ESPECIALLY SINCE IT DOES AFFECT GCOB EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. I WAS LEFT WITH THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT ADDERLEY FAVORED NOT ONLY CONTINUANCE OF THE PROJECT, WHICH HE STATED, BUT WAS LIKELY TO SUPPORT A MORE RATHER THAN LESS AMBITIOUS GCOB EFFORT. THIS, OF COURSE WILL BE DEPENDENT IN SOME MEASURE UPON HOW EFFECTIVELY WE CAN PROVIDE DETAILED RPT DETAILED PLANS WHICH GCOB CAN COMPREHEND. USG FAILURE TO HAVE A DETAILED PLAN AFTER 18 MONTHS IS SINGLE MOST SERIOUS IMPEDIMENT TO ACHIEVING GCOB COMPREHENSION AND SUPPORT.

WEISS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: LIVESTOCK, RESEARCH, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, PROGRAMS (PROJECTS)
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 05 OCT 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CollinP0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974NASSAU01712
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740283-0355
From: NASSAU
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741069/aaaacgwg.tel
Line Count: 375
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ARA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CollinP0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09 SEP 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <09 SEP 2002 by elyme>; APPROVED <12 MAR 2003 by CollinP0>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: BLRD: DISCUSSION WITH MINEXTAFF ADDERLEY FOR AID/ AA/TA
TAGS: EAID, EAGR, BF, US, (ADDERLEY)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005